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Abstract—The SQL injection attacks (SQLIAs) vulnerability is 
extremely widespread and poses a serious security threat to 
web applications with built-in access to databases. The SQLIA 
adversary intelligently exploits the SQL statement parsing 
operation by web servers via specially constructed SQL 
statements that subtly lead to non-explicit executions or 
modifications of corresponding database tables. In this paper, 
we present a formal and methodical way of modeling SQLIAs 
by way of augmented attack trees. This modeling explicitly 
captures the particular subtle incidents triggered by SQLIA 
adversaries and corresponding state transitions. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first known attack tree modelling of 
SQL injection attacks. 
Keywords-Augmented Attack Tree; SQL Injection Attack; 
Modelling 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Since web applications have become one of the most 
important communication channels between service 
providers and clients, more script kiddies and sophisticated 
hackers target victims either for fun, commercial reasons or 
personal gain. The increasing frequency and complexity of 
web based attacks has raised awareness of web application 
administrators of the need to effectively protect their web 
applications. The OWASP 2010 report places Injection 
Attacks, including SQLIAs, as the most likely and damaging 
[9]. SQLIAs are caused by attackers inserting a malicious 
SQL query into the web application to manipulate data, or 
even to gain access to the back-end database. The main 
reason contributing to the successful SQLIAs is due to bad 
web application design and implementation. In design and 
development phase, SQLIAs can be prevented by some 
adherence to guidelines including: validation of inputs before 
passing them to the database; the use of safe SQL statements 
for data access; and providing no error messages [4]. 
In assessing the risk of a web based system against 
SQLIAs and in facilitating detection of such intrusions, there 
is a need to properly model SQLIAs especially the subtly 
constructed SQL statements. 
In this paper, we model SQLIAs with the Augmented 
Attack Tree (AAT) [6]–[8] technique and furthermore 
propose regular expressions as a solution to generically 
capture the subtle SQLIA-constructed statements. Attack 
trees describe attacks toward a system as a construction of 
atomic attacks modelled as states that an attack must go 
through to achieve success [2]. Such trees focus on the 
analysis of measurable goals that can ultimately be translated 
into specific tests against real-world implementations. While 
conventional attack trees have been widely used [1]–[3], [5], 
[10], they only concentrate on displaying the states of an 
attack. We argue that for SQLIAs it is crucial to explicitly 
model the transition process (edge of the attack tree) between 
states as well, and therefore conventional attack trees cannot 
provide sufficient information for analysis of SQLIAs. Our 
SQLIA modeling based on the Augmented Attack Tree 
allows to explicitly link regular expressions capturing 
generic signatures to different types of SQLIAs. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
provides background information about SQLIAs and 
describes the attack tree modeling techniques including the 
conventional attack tree and augmented attack tree. Section 3 
shows our proposed SQLIA modeling. Section 4 reviews the 
related works. Finally in Section 5, conclusion and further 
work are presented. 
II. PRELIMINARIES 
Wherever Times is specified, Times Roman or Times 
New Roman may be used. If neither is available on your 
word processor, please use the font closest in appearance to 
Times. Avoid using bit-mapped fonts if possible. True-Type 
1 or Open Type fonts are preferred. Please embed symbol 
fonts, as well, for math, etc. 
A. Background on SQL Injection Attacks 
SQLIAs are command-injection attacks where the 
attacker injects a malicious SQL query into back-end 
database through web application interface. The back-end 
database executes the system defined SQL statement with 
injected SQL query, and sends the corresponding execution 
results back to the attacker. The attacker could submit 
malicious SQL commands directly to the back-end database 
to extract confidential information or even obtain the root 
privilege of database. 
SQLIAs are classified into seven types: Tautologies; 
Illegal/Logically Incorrect Queries; UNION Query; Piggy-
Backed Queries; Stored Procedures; Inference and Alternate 
Encodings [13]. There are ten kinds of attack goals of 
SQLIAs: identify injectable parameters; identify database 
finger-prints; determine database schema; extract data; add 
or modify data; perform denial of service; evade detection; 
bypass authentication; execute remote commands; and 
escalate privilege [13]. Any of the attack goals can be 
achieved by any of the types, so there are a large 
combination of attacks. _____________________________________ 
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 B. Attack Tree Modeling 
1) Conventional Attack Trees. Attack trees were defined  
to  model  threats  against  computer  network  sys- tems 
[11]. According to varying attacks, attack trees provide a 
formal, methodical way to describe the security of system. 
The tree structure is utilized to represent attacks against a 
system, with the root node representing the ultimate attack 
goal and the branches representing ways to achieve the goal. 
Two connection types, OR and AND, are used to connect 
multiple child nodes with same parent node. OR means that 
the goal can be reached if any one of the subgoals is reached, 
whereas AND means that the goal can be reached only if 
all of subgoals are reached. 
Construction of an attack tree depends on the expertise 
of the analyst. Any designing errors result in a flawed attack 
tree and lead to incorrect analysis. An attack tree is built 
from the attacker’s point of view, therefore, the attack tree 
analyst must conceive as an attacker with infinite resources, 
knowledge and skill [2]. 
2) Augmented Attack Tree. Augmented Attack Tree 
(AAT) [6]–[8], [14] extended the conventional attack tree 
by associating with each branch a sequence of malicious 
operations  that  could  have  been  used  in  the  attack. The 
formalization of AAT is stated as follows [7], [8]: 
Definition 1. An augmented attack tree is a rooted labeled 
tree given by AAT= <V, E, ε, Label, SIGu,v>, where 
 V  is  the  set  of  nodes  in  the  tree  representing  
the different states of partial compromise or sub-
goals that an attacker needs to move through in order 
to fully compromise a system. ν ? V is a special 
node, distinguished from others, that forms the root 
of the tree. It represents the ultimate goal of the 
attacker, namely system compromise. The set V can 
be partitioned into two subsets, leaf nodes and 
internal nodes, such that 
 leaf_nodes ??internal_nodes=V, 
 leaf_nodes ? internal_nodes=Φ ;, 
 ν??internal nodes 
 E ⊆  V×V constitutes the set of edges in the attack 
tree. An edge <u,v> ? E defines an atomic attack 
and represents the state transition from a child node 
v to a parent node u, u, v ? V. An atomic attack is a 
sequence of incidents. The edge <u, v> is said to be 
“emergent from” v and “incident to” u. 
 ε  is a set of tuples of the form <v, decomposition> 
such that 
 ν? internal nodes and  
 decomposition ? [AND-decomposition, OR- 
decomposition] 
 Label is the name of the exploit associated with each 
edge. 
 SIGu,v is  an  attack  signature  which  is  defined as 
 Definition 3 below. 
 Definition 2. An incident-choice is a group of related 
incidents, the occurrence of any one of which can 
contribute towards the state transition in the attack 
tree. 
  
 Definition  3.  An attack signature SIGu,v is a 
sequence of incident-choices (incident-choice1, 
incident-choice2, . . ., incident-choicen)  such  that  
the  sequence  (incidenti,1, incidenti,2, . . . , 
incidentm,n ) constitute an atomic attack. 
 Modeling SQL Injection Attacks 
 This section shows our modelling of SQLIAs with 
AAT and regular expressions. Of the seven well 
known SQLIA types [13], we model: Tautology 
Query; Logically Incorrect Query; UNION Query; 
Piggy-Backed Query; and Timing Inference Query. 
We ignored to model Stored Procedures, Alternate 
Encodings and Blind Injection Inference Query 
because of the following: Stored Procedures 
provides the functionality to consolidate and 
centralize logic that was originally implemented in 
applications. As such the content of a stored 
procedure is not distinct from other SQLIA at- tacks, 
so cannot be modeled separately. Alternate 
Encodings provide different coding practices and is 
used in conjunction with other SQL based attacks. 
The attacker injects a Blind Injection Inference 
Query mainly dependent on individual’s intuition 
and experience without the assistant of database 
feedback information. The injection contents are the 
same as other SQLIA methods. Therefore, we focus 
on modeling with above mentioned five types. In 
this section, we first discuss the mechanism of 
modeling. Then, we model each type of SQLIAs in 
turn. 
  
 Modeling  Mechanism 
 The modeling of SQLIA obeys the definition of 
AAT. For lack of a better name, we term our 
modeling result as Augmented SQL Injection Attack 
Tree (ASQLIAT). 
 Node. A node in ASQLIAT represents the state. The 
child node represents the state during whole attack 
procedure. The root node represents SQLIA as the 
ultimate goal. Since the first step of computer 
network attack is usually to identify the  attack  
object,  we  assume  that  the  leaf  node  in  all 
branches is the state that the attacker found out the 
targeted web application. There is a pair of brackets 
containing the symbol to distinguish each node. 
Those symbols indicate the parent node or child 
node in signature. 
Edge. An edge in ASQLIAT represents the state 
transition from the child node to the parent node with a set of 
incidents. 
Incident.  An incident in ASQLIAT represents either the 
injection behavior or the web server execution behavior. 
Label.  A label in ASQLIAT represents the edge name. 
Signature.  An SQLIA signature is the related regular 
expression that captures the SQL statement constructed by 
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 the SQLIA adversary to mount the particular type of SQL 
injection attack. For clarity of illustration, we model the 
signature with Perl’s regular expression style [12] (although 
any regular expression syntax can be used w.l.o.g). Table 1 
illustrates the elements of a modelled SQLIA signature and 
corresponding expression symbols. It is important to note 
that square brackets indicate the matching of any characters 
inside them, round brackets indicate the matching of the 
whole pattern inside them and plus mark indicates character 
matching more than 1 time. In addition, we utilize a pair of 
curly brackets to include a set of possible incidents or 
signatures in each edge. 
 
TABLE I.  .  ELEMENTS AND EXPRESSIONS OF SIGNATURE 
 
Element Symbol 
 
Alphanumeric  \w 
Comment Mark  (\-\-) 
Quotation Mark    [’”] 
Comparison Mark ([=<>]|[<>!]=) 
Logical Keyword    (OR) 
Type  (int|char|varchar) 
Type Conversion Keyword (CONVERT|CAST) 
SQL Keyword (SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE|DROP) 
UNION Keyword  (UNION | UNION ALL)   
Delimiter Mark   ; 
Delay Tim                                                         \d+ 
 White Space                                                     \s 
Bracket  \c 
Case Insensitive /i 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the generated ASQLIAT. The leaf node, 
i.e. Found Web Application denotes the state where the 
adversary has found a particular attack target. Then, the 
attacker performs some actions to explore suitable places to 
inject command(s) into the database through web applica- 
tions. Usually, the attacker injects the malicious command 
through either any input forms on the web application or via 
the URL header. Therefore, the transiting incidents along the 
edge can be taken from the set {Web Page Form Access, 
URL Header Access}; and upon successful execution of 
either incident, the adversary progresses to the next state:  
Found Injection Place. The expression below shows the 
incidents and their corresponding signatures. In signature, 2 
indicates the second state as parent node and 1 indicates the 
first state as child node. 
Incident ? {Web Page Form Access, URL Header Access} 
SIG2,1 ?{SIGWeb , SIGURL } 
 
C. Tautology Query 
The Tautology Query attack injects a piece of malicious 
code into one or more conditional statements so that they 
always evaluate to true and generate the result according to 
the evaluated true condition. Branch (1) in Figure 1 
illustrates the generated Tautology Query in ASQLIAT. It is 
clearly show that it contains four states and three edges. The 
second edge which resides in between the state Found 
Injection Place and Web Server Execute Tautology Query is 
the Tautology Query Injection. For this kind of attack, the 
most significant feature of injection content is containing 
three key parts: OR; true condition; and comment mark. In 
the generated signature, it must include those three parts. In 
order to model and identify this attack is Tautology attack; 
the attacker injected code should meet the defined signature, 
which is shown as below, 
Incident ?{Tautology Query Statement} 
SIGT3, T2 ?{/[’”]\s+(OR)\s+\w+\s*([=<>]|[<>!]=)\s*\w+ 
\-\-/i} 
When the state of Web Server Execute Tautology Query 
happened, the only way to transit into SQLIA state is 
through the edge Tautology Attack. There must be some 
incidents to indicate the achieving of SQLIA. The set of is 
{Bypass Authentication, Information Retrieval}. Once either 
of the incidents happen, the attack state achieve. 
Incident?{Bypass Authentication, Information Retrieval} 
SIGR, T3 ?{SIGBA , SIGIR } 
 
D. Logically Incorrect Query 
Logically Incorrect Query attack is the attacker intent to 
obtain the error feedback message by injecting incorrect 
command into the database. The database structure and type 
information can be extracted according to the error message. 
Branch (2) in Figure 1 displays the generated Logically 
Incorrect Query branch in ASQLIAT. The labels of second 
edge and third edge are Logically Incorrect Query and 
Logically Incorrect Query Attack. The trick of this SQLIA is 
changing the data type of injected data and providing 
different data type against system defined data type. 
Database server returns error feedback message which can 
assist the attacker to further explore database server. 
Keywords to change different data type are CONVERT and 
CAST and either of them must be exist in the query. 
Therefore, the signature to detect this attack must contain 
those keywords. Once the attacker triggers the incident in 
second edge, the state transits into the state of Web Server 
Execute Logically Incorrect Query. The generated signature 
is stated as follows, 
Incident?{Logically Incorrect Query Statement}  
SIGLI3,LI2 ?{/(CONVERT|CAST)\s*\c+\s*(int|char| 
varchar)/i}  
For  the  last  edge  which  leading  to  SQLIA  state,  it’s 
incident contains Return Error Message from Database and 
Information Retrieval. 
Incident ? {Return Error Message from Database, 
Information Retrieval} 
SIGR,LI3 ?{SIGEM , SIGIR } 
 
E. UNION Query 
The UNION Query attack is to inject UNION keyword 
following with another SELECT query statement. The result 
is database returns the dataset that is the union results of 
the original first query and the injected second query. The 
generated UNION Query branch is shown as Branch (3) 
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 in Figure 1. The label of second edge is UNION Query 
Injection and the label of top edge is UNION Query Attack. 
The most important keywords in the injected code are 
UNION and SELECT. So, the generated signature is: 
Incident ?{UNION Query Statement} 
 
Figure 1.  Augmented Attack Tree Modeling of SQL Injection Attacks 
SIGU3,U2 ?{/[”]\s+(UNION|UNION\s+ALL)\s+(SELECT) 
/i} 
The label in top edge is UNION Query Attack. The 
possible incidents are Information Retrieval and Bypass 
Authentication. 
Incident?{Information Retrieval, Bypass Authentication} 
SIGR,U3 ?{SIGI R , SIGBA } 
F. Piggy-Backed  Query 
In Piggy-Backed Query attack, the query be extened by 
injecting additional queries after the original one. 
Consequently, the database receives multiple SQL queries 
and executes them in sequence. Branch (4) in Figure 1 
illustrates the Piggy-Backed Query branch in ASQLIAT. 
The incident in the second edge, which label is Piggy-
Backed Query Injection, is to inject multiple queries into the 
original one. Because Piggy-Backed Query combines 
several SQL query together, there must be some data 
manipulation keywords or data definition keywords. It’s 
wise to model the signature with those keywords following 
with a delimiter which indicates the ending of previous 
query. 
Incident?{Piggy-Backed Query Statement} 
SIGPB3, PB2?{/[’”]\s*;\s*(SELECT|INSERT|UPDATE| 
DELETE |DROP)/i} 
The incidents in the top edge, which label is Piggy-
Backed Query Attack, can be Information Retrieval, 
Information Modification and Perform DoS. 
Incident ? {Information Retrieval,  Information 
Modifica- tion and Perform DoS} 
SIGR, PB3 ?{SIGIR , SIGIM , SIGDoS } 
 
G. Timing  Inference  Query 
 The inference attack implemented according to the 
obtained result from a true or false evaluation about data 
values in the database. In this kind of attack, the target web 
server has been secured enough so that there is no enough or 
usable feedback error messages. In this situation, the attacker 
injects malicious command into the web server and then 
observes how the website changes. 
For Timing Inference Query, the attacker injects query 
with both if/then evaluation statement and delay time. The 
attacker then obtains information from the database by 
monitoring the timing delay as the response of the database. 
If the timing delay take place, it means that the injected 
if/then evaluation statement been executed successfully by 
database server. Otherwise, the statement is wrong and need 
further modification. The last branch in Figure 1 displays the 
modeling of this kind of SQLIA. The label of edge between 
the state Found Injection Place and the state Web Server 
Execute Timing Inference Query, is Timing Inference Query 
Injection. It is important to contain the keyword WAITFOR 
and the length of waiting time in the generated signature. 
The generated signature is stated as follows, 
Incident?{Timing Inference Query Statement} 
SIGTI3, TI2 ?{/(WAITFOR)\s+\d+/i} 
Moreover, the label of top edge is Timing Inference 
Attack.  The possible incidents are Information Retrieval, 
Information Modification and Identify Database Scheme. 
Incident ? {Information Retrieval,  Information 
Modification and Identify Database Scheme} 
SIGR, TI3 ? {SIGIR , SIGIM , SIGDS } 
III. RELATED WORKS 
Poolsapassit and Ray [6] proposed another Augmented 
Attack Tree (AAT). AAT [6] applied the conventional attack 
tree with extra attack probability labels. A label l is 
associated with a node S, given by the tuple <n, m> where 
m and n are positive integers greater than 0 with ??m. m is 
termed the least effort to compromise subgoal S while n is 
termed the number of currently compromised subgoals under 
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 S. The ratio n/m provides the measure of how far an attacker 
has progressed towards the ultimate goal in terms of the least 
effort along the most advanced attack path that s/he has been 
through. Wang et al. [14] improved augmented attack tree [6] 
with a notion of “minimal attack tree” and proposed a new 
trimming attack tree algorithm to reduce the redundant 
branches. 
Byres et al. [1] described the first work of how the attack 
tree methodology be implemented to the SCADA protocol 
MODBUS/TCP with risk metrics. Their attack tree analysis 
was qualitative used to identify level of technical difficulty, 
severity of impact, probability of detection and the 
underlying critical vulnerabilities. Lin et al. [3] applied 
attack tree to model the threat of Cross Site Request Forgery 
(CSRF) attacks. Morais et al. [5] utilized attack tree to 
describe known attacks and derive injection test scenarios to 
evaluate the security properties of the protocol. Khand [2] 
presented the syntax and graphical representation of five 
kinds of new nodes as the extension of the conventional 
attack tree to model the security of systems. Saini et al. [10] 
constructed attack tree to study and evaluate the security of 
MyProxy system with all the possible threats, the cost of 
attack execution by attacker and the cost of damage from 
attack. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In  this  paper,  we  have  presented  a  method  for  
modelling SQLIAs with the Augmented Attack Tree and 
regular expressions  to  capture subtle SQL statements 
formed by SQLIA adversaries. This approach is generic, thus 
it can be made to equally apply to other kinds of web based 
attacks. 
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